UK complicity and the torture of Mustafa al-Hawsawi

Mustafa al-Hawsawi is a Saudi national arbitrarily detained at Guantánamo Bay. Between 2003-2006 he was held in the CIA torture programme, detained and tortured in secret prisons around the world. The IPT is investigating UK complicity in this mistreatment.

In May 2023, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) ruled for the first time that it had jurisdiction to consider a complaint brought by a current Guantánamo detainee, Mustafa al-Hawsawi, in relation to UK complicity in his mistreatment during his time as a prisoner in the CIA torture programme.¹ This case is significant, and has been reported as the first ‘full investigation by the tribunal in relation to prisoners held in the CIA’s secret detention programme.’²

Mustafa al-Hawsawi is a Saudi national who has been detained arbitrarily in US military custody at Guantánamo Bay since September 2006, in conditions which have, according to his legal team, ‘left him largely isolated from the outside world and which involve very stringent restrictions on his ability to communicate with lawyers.’³ These restrictions include a prohibition on any direct contact between al-Hawsawi and his UK legal representatives, as well as a prohibition on his US legal team (representing him in the Military Commission proceedings) from assisting or advising his UK team.

Prior to his rendition to US military custody at Guantánamo Bay in September 2006, Mustafa al-Hawsawi was held incommunicado in secret CIA detention for three and a half years. During this time, he was forcibly rendered (transferred) between a number of secret prisons (black sites) at locations around the world, and held in some of the most inhumane conditions. He was also subjected to routine, severe torture by CIA personnel, including being repeatedly beaten, deprived of sleep, placed in painful stress positions for extended periods of time, subjected to water torture (including drowning), placed in extremely small boxes, and raped.

There is, according to al-Hawsawi’s legal team, ‘credible evidence in the public domain that the UK Agencies and/or their employees, servants and/or agents aided, abetted, encouraged, facilitated, procured and/or conspired with the US authorities in the torture and ill-treatment of Mr al-Hawsawi.’ Specifically, British involvement was likely to include ‘providing questions and/or information to US officials to be put to Mr al-Hawsawi during interrogations and/or by receiving information obtained from Mr al-Hawsawi during interrogations, while being aware/the circumstances being such that they ought to have been aware, that Mr al-Hawsawi was being subjected or was likely to be subjected to torture and/or ill-treatment.’⁴

Indeed, this form of UK involvement has been found by the Intelligence and Security Committee to have taken place in the case of other so-called High-Value Detainees held and tortured in CIA black sites. For example, British intelligence officials were aware from early on that Abu Zubaydah, the first man to be held as part of the CIA’s torture programme, was being ‘subjected to some harsh interrogation techniques, including sleep deprivation, and that it was considered that 98 per cent of US Special Forces would have broken if subject to the same conditions.’ Nonetheless, the Agencies continued to send the CIA questions to be used in his interrogations from at least May 2002 to 2006.⁵

Likewise, British intelligence fed questions to the CIA for use during the torture of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, despite knowledge that he was ‘being treated harshly in detention at an unknown location.’ Questions were sent to the CIA for use with Mohammed throughout March 2003, during the same time that he was being held in a secret prison in Poland, was waterboarded 183 times, and was subjected to sleep deprivation for more than seven days at a time.⁶

Given that Mustafa al-Hawsawi was also considered by the CIA to be a High-Value Detainee – and given that he was captured at the same location and same time as Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, and detained in many of the same black sites (sometimes at the same time) – his legal team have argued that there is a ‘a strong presumption that Mr al-Hawsawi’s case is one of those in which the UK Agencies participated in intelligence sharing and complicity in torture and ill-treatment at US black sites.’⁷

Given the torture to which al-Hawsawi was being subjected while held at the Dark Prison (including water torture, confinement, stress positions, extended sleep deprivation, starvation and anal rape), given the clear interest in interrogating him about UK-based operatives and plots, and given the documented evidence that British intelligence in other cases was feeding questions into the torture of CIA prisoners held in black sites, the presumption of UK complicity in this case is clearly strong.

The IPT have signalled the need to examine this case with care. Although the case at the IPT is ongoing, with hearings in June 2025, the Tribunal’s May 2023 judgment over jurisdiction was delivered not least due to the judges’ determination that ‘the underlying issues raised by this complaint are of the gravest possible kind.’⁹

Building on our larger investigation into the CIA torture programme, published in our report CIA Torture Unredacted,¹⁰ this briefing provides an account of Mustafa al-Hawsawi’s time in secret CIA detention, including the severe torture he experienced and his forcible transfer (rendition) between at least five black sites between 2003-2006.

Torture in the CIA’s ‘Dark Prison’, Afghanistan

Mustafa al-Hawsawi was captured by Pakistani forces in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, on 1 March 2003, alongside Khaled Sheikh Mohammed.¹¹ Both men were held in Pakistani detention for a number of days, during which time they were interrogated by CIA officers and Pakistani officials, and subjected to sleep deprivation.¹² They were then rendered to Afghanistan at some point between 3-5 March 2003 and held in a secret facility known by many prisoners as the ‘Dark Prison’.¹³ At this point, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed became the CIA’s 45^th prisoner, and Mustafa al-Hawsawi became the CIA’s 46^th prisoner.¹⁴

The Dark Prison, referred to as DETENTION SITE COBALT by the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) study into the CIA’s torture programme, was situated about three miles from Kabul airport, within a larger compound operated by the CIA for a range of functions, including for training Afghan counterterrorism forces.¹⁵ It was little more than a dungeon. The prison consisted of 20 individual concrete structures used as cells, three interrogation rooms, a staff room, a guardroom and a ‘conditioning room that was used for water dousing.’¹⁶ The cells were described as ‘stand-alone concrete boxes’ with a metal ring attached low to the wall to which prisoners were shackled. Four of the cells were designed specifically for sleep deprivation, with bars high up between two walls to which prisoners could be secured. Although cells had windows, these were blacked out with two coats of black paint and heavy curtains. Each cell had speakers. Overall, according to one CIA memo, the prison had been established ‘with isolation of the detainee being the primary goal. Each detainee’s interaction with the outside world was intended to be limited to brief contact with the guards and more extensive contact with his CIA interrogators. This allows CIA personnel to control almost all aspects of the detainees’ existence.’¹⁷

According to the prison’s site manager, this control was exercised through maximising the isolation and disorientation of prisoners, which was achieved through both continual darkness, ‘so the detainees would not know the passage of time,’ and continual loud music, ‘to prevent communications among the prisoners so they are given the sense that they exist in isolation.’¹⁸ These conditions were extreme, and ‘WOW-ed’ a delegation from the US Federal Bureau of Prisons who arrived in November 2002 to assess practices, provide training and make recommendations. Reports from the delegation make clear that they had ‘never been in a facility where individuals are so sensory deprived, i.e., constant white noise, no talking, everyone in the dark, with the guards wearing a light on their head when they collected and escorted a detainee to an interrogation cell, detainees constantly being shackled to the wall or floor, and the starkness of each cell (concrete and bars).’ There was, the delegation reported, ‘nothing like this in the Federal Bureau of Prisons.’¹⁹

Generally, prisoners were initially shackled with one hand to the wall in a seated position. Sometimes, after the passage of some weeks (‘if the prisoner is older, or otherwise non-threatening’) this positioning was reassessed. Prisoners were fed just once a day, and were held naked or clothed in diapers. There was no drainage in the cells, and there were ‘buckets for human waste.’²⁰ Presumably as a result of the lack of sanitary provision, guards at the site complained of smells; the CIA’s solution was to provide them with surgical masks.²¹ Officials from the CIA Renditions Group, visiting the site in December 2002, concluded that the facility’s ‘“baseline conditions” involved so much deprivation that any further deprivation would have limited impact on the interrogations.’²² Instead, guards provided comforts as incentive to cooperate, such as lights, blankets, or a mat to sleep on. The site also had a cell referred to as the ‘luxury suite’, containing a rocking chair and ‘foamies’ for prisoners’ ears to block out the noise.²³ In addition to the concrete cells, the site had a second ‘section’ where ‘prisoners were interrogated and guards congregated.’²⁴

This layout has been independently confirmed by several prisoners who were held there. Khaled al-Maqtari has described and sketched the prison in some detail,²⁵ while Mohammed al-Shoroeiya has described the facility as comprising several different types of rooms used for interrogation and torture: ‘One was a group of rooms where he was interrogated. Another set of rooms were freezing cold and were used to submerge the prisoners in icy water while lying on plastic sheeting on the ground. A third set of rooms he called the “torture rooms”, where they used specific instruments. One of these instruments was a wood plank that they used to abuse him with water.’²⁶

Whereas the torture of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed began almost immediately upon the men’s arrival at the Dark Prison, staff shortages at the site meant that al-Hawsawi was not interrogated or debriefed for several days.²⁷  His first interrogation by the CIA was by the Chief of Interrogations, on 10 March 2003, where he was given a ‘bath’, not least because he had ‘defecated and urinated in his diaper.’²⁸ In reality, this consisted of laying al-Hawsawi on a blue tarp on the floor, and dousing him with cold water while questioning him. Interrogators then used the facial slap, stomach slap, and a range of stress positions while questioning him, before returning him to the ‘standing sleep deprivation position’ in his cell.²⁹ There was clearly more to come: as one cable from the black site stated, ‘We have just started with subject… Subject is tough both mentally and physically, but is wearing down and is being conditioned to answer direct questions.’³⁰

However, it doesn’t appear as though there were strong intelligence grounds driving these torture sessions. Indeed, one of his interrogators later cabled Headquarters to request information on what al-Hawsawi may actually know, given that ‘he does not appear to the [sic] be a person that is a financial mastermind. However, we lack facts with which to confront [al-Hawsawi]. What we need at this point is substantive information vice supposition.’³¹

Rotation of staff during March 2003 saw a lull in the interrogation of al-Hawsawi. By 2 April 2003, however, the new team of interrogators concluded that he was withholding information, and re-requested authorisation for his torture.³² On 4 April 2003, Headquarters approved the use of slapping, grasping, stress positions, cramped confinement and walling, and on 6 April al-Hawsawi was tortured for 14 hours, with interrogators using ‘continuous rotational sessions of water-dousing, walling, attention grasps, facial holds, cramped confinement and psychological pressures.’³³

Much of the information which relates to this interrogation session, contained in a report by the CIA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) – some two-and-a-half pages – remains redacted.³⁴ From al-Hawsawi’s own testimony, however (provided while he was still being held incommunicado, and therefore unaware of other detainee experiences), it appears that he was waterboarded during this session. He has testified that he was strapped to the board, which was ‘a rotating table made of wood with a bed of shiny metal.’ According to his account, ‘his head was tilted in the down position’ and ‘several bottles of water were poured on his chest so that the water ran into his face and nose and he thought he was drowning. He said he was put on the table many times during that interrogation period, with multiple bottles of water each time.’³⁵

Later, in November 2003, an email from a different CIA interrogator outlined that al-Hawsawi had described his treatment during the April 2003 interrogation in terms which suggest he might have been waterboarded, or else subjected to treatment that ‘could be indistinguishable from the water board.’³⁶ This was despite the fact that the use of the waterboard had not been authorized for use on al-Hawsawi. According to this interrogator: ‘[h]e explained to [redacted] and me a process that sounded like more than water dousing…. We did not prompt al-Hawsawi – he described the process and the table on his own… I have serious reservations about watering them in a prone position because if not done with care, the net effect can approach the effect of the water board. If one is held down on his back, on the table or on the floor, with water poured in his face I think it goes beyond dousing and the effect, to the recipient, could be indistinguishable from the water board.’³⁷ Another CIA officer, interviewed by the OIG, also ‘recalled that [redacted] used the water board on either Hawsawi or KSM in March and that several personnel witnessed this usage.’³⁸

Other CIA officers interviewed by the OIG confirmed that there was a waterboard in the interrogation room, and that al-Hawsawi was given a clear indication that it was there. Most of those interviewed deny that he was strapped to the board, instead claiming that he was doused while prone on the floor. The waterboard was, according to these witnesses, ‘located at the back of the conditioning room collecting dust and used by the analysts to sit on or lean on during water dousing.’³⁹

Indeed, photographs seen by the SSCI include one of a waterboard at the site, which was ‘surrounded by buckets, with a bottle of unknown pink solution (filled two thirds of the way to the top) and a watering can resting on the wooden beams of the water board,’ while others detained at the site during the same period as al-Hawsawi also testified to the use of the waterboard, as did CIA staff at the site.⁴⁰

It is possible that the redacted sections of the 6 April interrogation session also include details of the use of ‘rectal rehydration’, a form of anal rape. Al-Hawsawi was one of two men who experienced this form of torture while detained at the Dark Prison, with Khaled Sheikh Mohammed subjected to this immediately upon his arrival at the site.⁴¹  For his part, CIA records show that al-Hawsawi’s ‘rectal rehydration’ was applied with ‘excessive force’, and as a result he was later diagnosed with ‘chronic haemorrhoids, an anal fissure, and symptomatic rectal prolapse.’⁴²

Whatever the torture which took place, by the end of the 6 April session al-Hawsawi was judged to be ‘cooperative’. By 7 May 2003, however, officers moved back from debriefing to interrogation mode, and a third request for authorisation was cabled to Headquarters. This was authorised, and al-Hawsawi was ‘bathed’ and subjected to standing sleep deprivation. This interrogation phase lasted until 12 May, whereupon he was again judged to be ‘cooperative’.⁴³

The torture of al-Hawsawi at the Dark Prison appears to have been authorised without any concrete information concerning his knowledge of other terror suspects, or future plots. Indeed, the Chief of Interrogations at the site logged concern that the rationale for the use of these techniques was based on ‘supposition’ rather than hard facts, and that interrogation instructions from Headquarters at that time were ‘not valid or well thought out’, including in the case of al-Hawsawi.⁴⁴

Rendition from Afghanistan

Al-Hawsawi remained in the Dark Prison until November 2003, whereupon he was rendered to what the OIG report referred to as ‘another location.’⁴⁵ Our larger investigation into the CIA torture programme, as published in CIA Torture Unredacted, has identified this next location as the US military base at Guantánamo Bay, wherein the CIA operated two black sites for a number of months during 2003-2004.⁴⁶

Al-Hawsawi was held at the black sites in Guantánamo Bay from November 2003 until April 2004. By this point, CIA lawyers had become increasingly concerned at the possible implications of a forthcoming US Supreme Court ruling, which looked likely to grant habeas corpus rights to US military prisoners at Guantánamo Bay, and which might have also applied to the CIA’s own prisoners on the island. This would have made the secret prisoners both visible and eligible for legal representation if they remained on the base. As a result of these concerns, the CIA rendered all of its detainees, including al-Hawsawi, to other sites in its secret prison network.⁴⁷

After his period of secret detention at a CIA black site at Guantánamo Bay, al-Hawsawi was held either at the CIA’s black site in Romania (DETENTION SITE BLACK), or at a Moroccan detention facility which held detainees on behalf of the CIA at various points 2003-2005, before being rendered to the CIA black site in Lithuania in either February or October 2005.

Secret detention in Lithuania

The CIA secret prison in Lithuania, referred to by the SSCI as DETENTION SITE VIOLET, had been constructed in a former horse-riding school in the village of Antaviliai, on the edge of woodland 15 miles from Vilnius.⁵⁹ Locals have testified to significant construction activity during the summer of 2004, with the excavation of large amounts of earth and the conversion of existing buildings into a secure facility, with security cameras, fencing and no windows. Accounts exist of multiple shipping containers arriving by road throughout this time, carrying raw building materials and also prefabricated components. According to ABC News, citing unnamed Lithuanian and US officials: ‘The riding academy originally consisted of an indoor riding area with a red metallic roof, a stable and a cafe. The CIA built a thick concrete wall inside the riding area. Behind the wall, it built what one Lithuanian source called ‘a building within a building’. On a series of thick concrete pads, it installed what a source called ‘prefabricated pods’ to house prisoners, each separated from the other by five or six feet. Each pod included a shower, a bed, and a toilet. Separate cells were constructed for interrogations. The CIA converted much of the rest of the building into garage space. Intelligence officers working at the prison were housed next door in the converted stable, raising the roof to add space. Electrical power for both structures was provided by a 2003 Caterpillar autonomous generator. All the electrical outlets in the renovated structure were 110 volts, meaning they were designed for American appliances.’⁶⁰

The construction of this building was confirmed by the Lithuanian parliament’s Committee for National Security and Defence (CNSD), which found that ‘the necessary acquisitions were made for the purposes of implementation of the project, construction works were carried out to equip the facility, with the progress of works ensured by the partners [i.e., the CIA] themselves. The building was reconstructed to meet certain security requirements.’ Although the Committee could not confirm that detainees were actually held in the prison, they were clear that ‘the layout of the building, its enclosed nature and protection of the perimeter’ was designed for such a function.⁶¹ Likewise, a delegation from the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture completed a site visit in June 2010, and confirmed key aspects of the facility. The final report concluded that, although by that time (over four years since the prison had closed) the site in Antaviliai ‘did not contain anything that was highly suggestive of a context of detention,’ it could ‘be adapted for detention purposes with relatively little effort.’ Specifically, the delegation noted the existence of two interconnected buildings, one with a brown roof and one with a red roof. The latter building had a layout which ‘resembled a large metal container enclosed within a surrounding external structure. Two parts of this building (a fitness room and a technical area) contained apparatus, machinery and spare parts of US origin as well as instructions and notices written in English.’⁶²

Despite consistent denials by the Lithuanian authorities, the European Court of Human Rights found in May 2018 that it was ‘established beyond reasonable doubt that a CIA detention facility, codenamed Detention Site Violet according to the 2014 US Senate Committee Report, was located in Lithuania,’ and that it operated between February 2005 and March 2006.⁶³

The Lithuanian black site received its first prisoners in February 2005.⁶⁴ This may have included al-Hawsawi, or he may have been rendered to the site in October 2005. Regardless, one CIA cable from the site documented his medical complications after the earlier use of rectal rehydration.⁶⁵ Lithuanian officers refused to admit al-Hawsawi to a local hospital, and as such care for his serious medical issues was delayed. He was ultimately transferred to a third-party country for treatment, which in turn received payment from the CIA.⁶⁶

It was the difficulties between the CIA and the Lithuanian authorities regarding the treatment of al-Hawsawi which resulted in the closure of the black site in March 2006. At that point, all CIA prisoners at the site were transferred to DETENTION SITE BROWN in Afghanistan. Al-Hawsawi was then held in Afghanistan until his transfer into US military detention in Guantánamo Bay in September 2006 as one of the 14 CIA prisoners handed over to the US Department of Defense at that time.⁶⁷

1. Investigatory Powers Tribunal, Judgment: Al-Hawsawi v. Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service, GCHQ and Ministry of Defence, 26 May 2023. ↩︎
2. Harry Davies, UK Spies to be Investigated Over Claims They Were Complicit in Torture of CIA Prisoner, The Guardian, 31 May 2023. ↩︎
3. Investigatory Powers Tribunal, Amended Complaint: Al-Hawsawi v. Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service, GCHQ and Ministry of Defence, 15 May 2023, p. 1. ↩︎
4. Investigatory Powers Tribunal, Amended Complaint: Al-Hawsawi v. Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service, GCHQ and Ministry of Defence, 15 May 2023, p. 3. ↩︎
5. Intelligence and Security Committee, Detainee Mistreatment and Rendition, 2001-10, parliamentary report, 28 Jun 2018, p. 42. ↩︎
6. The Rendition Project and The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, CIA Torture Unredacted, Jul 2019, p. 193. ↩︎
7. Investigatory Powers Tribunal, Amended Complaint: Al-Hawsawi v. Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service, GCHQ and Ministry of Defence, 15 May 2023, p. 25. ↩︎
8. Central Intelligence Agency (ALEC), Cable: Questioning Ammar Al-Baluchi and Mustafa Al-Hawsawi on Heathrow Plot Operatives, [redacted] to [redacted], 16 Jul 2003, p. 2. ↩︎
9. Investigatory Powers Tribunal, Judgment: Al-Hawsawi v. Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service, GCHQ and Ministry of Defence, 26 May 2023, p. 16. ↩︎
10. The Rendition Project and The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, CIA Torture Unredacted, Jul 2019. ↩︎
11. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, p. 188; Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Inspector General), Disposition Memorandum: Alleged Use of Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques, document with attachment, case 2004-7604-IG, 6 Dec 2006, p. 9; US Department of Defense, Combatant Status Review Tribunal Hearing: Mustafa Al-Hawsawi, transcript, 21 Mar 2007, p. 24. ↩︎
12. Central Intelligence Agency, cable 41403, 2 March 2003, 09:49; Central Intelligence Agency, cable 41484, 3 March 2003, 13:15. ↩︎
13. Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Inspector General), Disposition Memorandum: Alleged Use of Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques, document with attachment, case 2004-7604-IG, 6 Dec 2006, p. 9. One cable from the site, dated March 2003 and authorising the torture of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, was sent two days before his transfer to Afghanistan. See: Central Intelligence Agency, cable 34354, [1-3] March 2003. Similarly, cables from Afghanistan dated 5 March document Mohammed’s torture. See Central Intelligence Agency, cable 34491, 5 March 2003, 14:00. ↩︎
14. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Appendix 2, CIA Detainees 2002-08 (Corrected), 6 Feb 2015. ↩︎
15. Christiaan Triebert and Haley Willis, Covert Evacuations and Planned Demolitions: How the CIA Left its Lase Base in Afghanistan, The New York Times, 1 Sep 2021. ↩︎
16. Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Inspector General), Disposition Memorandum: Alleged Use of Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques, document with attachment, case 2004-7604-IG, 6 Dec 2006, p. 9. ↩︎
17. Central Intelligence Agency, Memo: Death Investigation, Gul Rahman, [redacted] to Deputy Director for Operations, 28 Jan 2003, pp. 2-3. ↩︎
18. Central Intelligence Agency, Memo: [Redacted] Interview of [Redacted], [redacted] to [redacted], date redacted [Dec 2002], p. 3. ↩︎
19. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, p. 60. ↩︎
20. Central Intelligence Agency, Memo: [Redacted] Interview of [Redacted], [redacted] to [redacted], date redacted [Dec 2002], pp. 4, 6-7; Central Intelligence Agency, Memo: Rahman Death Investigation, Interview of [Redacted], [redacted], Chief of Counterintelligence Evaluation Branch, Counterespionage Group, Counterintelligence Center, date part redacted, [xx] Dec 2002, p. 2; US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, p. 49. ↩︎
21. Central Intelligence Agency, Memo: [Redacted] Interview of [Redacted], [redacted] to [redacted], date redacted [Dec 2002], p. 15. ↩︎
22. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, pp. 60-61. ↩︎
23. Central Intelligence Agency, Memo: [Redacted] Interview of [Redacted], [redacted] to [redacted], date redacted [Dec 2002], pp. 5-6. ↩︎
24. Central Intelligence Agency, Memo: Rahman Death Investigation, Interview of [Redacted], [redacted], Chief of Counterintelligence Evaluation Branch, Counterespionage Group, Counterintelligence Center, date part redacted, [xx] Dec 2002, p. 3. ↩︎
25. Amnesty International, A Case to Answer: From Abu Ghraib to Secret CIA Custody, the Case of Khaled Al-Maqtari, 13 Mar 2008, pp. 16-26. ↩︎
26. Human Rights Watch, Delivered Into Enemy Hands: US-Led Abuse and Rendition of Opponents to Gaddafi’s Libya, Sep 2012, pp. 45-47. ↩︎
27. Central Intelligence Agency, cable 34491, 5 March 2003, 14:00. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, p. 111. ↩︎
28. Central Intelligence Agency, Cable: [Redacted] Mar Interrogation of Mustafa Al-Hawsawi, [Redacted] to Director/Immediate Director, cable ref. 34757, date part redacted, [xx] Mar 2003 [10 Mar 2003]. ↩︎
29. Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Inspector General), Disposition Memorandum: Alleged Use of Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques, document with attachment, case 2004-7604-IG, 6 Dec 2006, pp. 10-11; Central Intelligence Agency, Cable: [Redacted] Mar Interrogation of Mustafa Al-Hawsawi, [Redacted] to Director/Immediate Director, cable ref. 34757, date part redacted, [xx] Mar 2003 [10 Mar 2003]. ↩︎
30. Central Intelligence Agency, Cable: [Redacted] Mar Interrogation of Mustafa Al-Hawsawi, [Redacted] to Director/Immediate Director, cable ref. 34757, date part redacted, [xx] Mar 2003 [10 Mar 2003]. ↩︎
31. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, pp. 431-432. ↩︎
32. Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Inspector General), Disposition Memorandum: Alleged Use of Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques, document with attachment, case 2004-7604-IG, 6 Dec 2006, pp. 12-13. ↩︎
33. Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Inspector General), Disposition Memorandum: Alleged Use of Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques, document with attachment, case 2004-7604-IG, 6 Dec 2006, p. 13. ↩︎
34. Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Inspector General), Disposition Memorandum: Alleged Use of Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques, document with attachment, case 2004-7604-IG, 6 Dec 2006, pp. 13-15. ↩︎
35. Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Inspector General), Disposition Memorandum: Alleged Use of Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques, document with attachment, case 2004-7604-IG, 6 Dec 2006, p. 6. ↩︎
36. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, p. 106. ↩︎
37. Central Intelligence Agency, Email: Al-Hawsawi Incident, 21 Nov 2003. ↩︎
38. Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Inspector General), Disposition Memorandum: Alleged Use of Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques, document with attachment, case 2004-7604-IG, 6 Dec 2006, pp. 17-18. ↩︎
39. Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Inspector General), Disposition Memorandum: Alleged Use of Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques, document with attachment, case 2004-7604-IG, 6 Dec 2006, p. 17. ↩︎
40. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, pp. 51, 107-108. The SSCI study goes on to say: ‘In meetings between the Committee Staff and the CIA in the summer of 2013, the CIA was unable to explain the details of the photograph, to include the buckets, solution, and watering can, as well as the water board’s presence at COBALT.’ ↩︎
41. Central Intelligence Agency, cable 34491, 5 March 2003, 14:00; Central Intelligence Agency, cable 34575, 6 March 2003, 19:29. ↩︎
42. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, p. 100. ↩︎
43. Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Inspector General), Disposition Memorandum: Alleged Use of Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques, document with attachment, case 2004-7604-IG, 6 Dec 2006, pp. 16-17. ↩︎
44. Central Intelligence Agency, Cable: [Redacted] Mar Interrogation of Mustafa Al-Hawsawi, [Redacted] to Director/Immediate Director, cable ref. 34757, date part redacted, [xx] Mar 2003 [10 Mar 2003]; US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, p. 121. ↩︎
45. Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Inspector General), Disposition Memorandum: Alleged Use of Unauthorized Interrogation Techniques, document with attachment, case 2004-7604-IG, 6 Dec 2006, p. 9. ↩︎
46. The Rendition Project and The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, CIA Torture Unredacted, Jul 2019. ↩︎
47. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, p. 141; Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, CIA Flight Carried Secret from Gitmo, Associated Press, 7 August 2010. ↩︎
48. The Rendition Project and The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, CIA Torture Unredacted, Jul 2019. ↩︎
49. Richmor Aviation, Invoice: SportsFlight Air, Trip 52158, 14 Apr 2004; SportsFlight Air, Invoice: CSC, LTS050602-0412, 27 Apr 2004. ↩︎
50. Richmor Aviation, Invoice: SportsFlight Air, Trip 55333, 6 Oct 2004; Computer Sciences Corporation and SportsFlight Air, Subcontract Task Order Modification, Subcontract S1007312, Task Order 10, 15 Oct 2004. ↩︎
51. Baseops, AFTN/SITA Text for N787WH, 18 Feb 2005, 18 Feb 2005. ↩︎
52. Lithuanian Civilines Aviacijos Administracija, Letter: Landing Records for N8213G, N961BW, N724CL and N787WH, 2003-05, Kestutis Auryla (Director) to Lydia Medland (Access Info Europe), 20 Jun 2011; Palanga Airport, Invoice: Victory Air Transport, Lithuania, 21 Feb 2005. ↩︎
53. Computer Sciences Corporation and SportsFlight Air, Subcontract Task Order Modification, Subcontract S1007312, Task Order 20, 17 Feb 2005. ↩︎
54. [Redacted], Email: N308AB Itinerary, [redacted] to [redacted], 29 Sep 2005; Computer Sciences Corporation, Preliminary Requirements, 4-5 Oct 2005, 28 Sep 2005. ↩︎
55. Baseops, AFTN/SITA Text for N787WH, 5-6 Oct 2005, 5 Oct 2005. ↩︎
56. Lithuanian Civilines Aviacijos Administracija, Letter: Landing Records for N8213G, N961BW, N724CL and N787WH, 2003-05, Kestutis Auryla (Director) to Lydia Medland (Access Info Europe), 20 Jun 2011; Vilnius Airport, Ground Handling Form, Lithuania, 6 Oct 2005. ↩︎
57. SportsFlight Air, Invoice: CSC, LTS050602-10038, 12 Oct 2005; SportsFlight Air, Invoice: CSC, LTS050602-10046, 12 Oct 2005; Computer Sciences Corporation and SportsFlight Air, Subcontract Task Order Modification, Subcontract S1008117, Task Order 53, 25 Oct 2005; Computer Sciences Corporation and SportsFlight Air, Subcontract Task Order Modification, Subcontract S1008117, Task Order 54, 25 Oct 2005. ↩︎
58. Miami Air International, AFTN/SITA Text for N733MA, 25 Mar 2006, 25 Mar 2006; SportsFlight Air, Invoice: CSC, LTS050602-0666, 30 Mar 2006; Miami Air International and SportsFlight Air, Flight Schedule, Contract M1195.06.02, 27 Mar 2006. ↩︎
59. Matthew Cole and Brian Ross, Exclusive: CIA Secret ‘Torture’ Prison Found at Fancy Horseback Riding Academy, ABC News, 18 Nov 2009. ↩︎
60. Matthew Cole and Brian Ross, Exclusive: CIA Secret ‘Torture’ Prison Found at Fancy Horseback Riding Academy, ABC News, 18 Nov 2009. ↩︎
61. Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, Alleged Transportation and Confinement of Persons Detained by the CIA in Lithuania, Seimas Committee on National Security and Defence, undated [22 Dec 2009], pp. 6-7. ↩︎
62. Council of Europe, Report to the Lithuanian Government on the Visit to Lithuania Carried Out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 19 May 2011. ↩︎
63. European Court of Human Rights, Judgment: Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, 31 May 2018, p. 241. ↩︎
64. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014. ↩︎
65. Central Intelligence Agency, cable 3223, date redacted. ↩︎
66. Al-Hawsawi was one of five CIA prisoners transferred to third-party countries for medical care, the others being Janat Gul, Gouled Dourad, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Khaled al-Maqtari. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, pp. 154, 493. ↩︎
67. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, pp. 61, 96, 154. ↩︎