UK complicity and the torture of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri

The Investigatory Powers Tribunal investigated UK complicity in the secret detention and torture of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, a Saudi national who was held within the CIA torture programme between 2002-06, detained and tortured in secret prisons around the world.

Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri is a Saudi national who was held in secret (unlawful) CIA detention in no fewer than nine different locations around the world between October 2002 and September 2006. He was, during this time, brutally tortured by CIA interrogators, including by being placed in extremely small boxes and being subjected to multiple sessions of water torture (drowning). Whilst detained at one secret prison (black site), in Poland, al-Nashiri was further subjected to mock execution with a handgun, mock torture with a power drill, and stress positions which were so severe that observers thought his shoulder might dislocate. Indeed, this torture was so severe that it led to the CIA’s chief of interrogations announcing his early retirement:

‘This morning I informed the front office of CTC that I will no longer be associated in any way with the interrogation program due to serious reservation I have about the current state of affairs. Instead, I will be retiring shortly. This is a train wreak (sic) waiting to happen and I intend to get the hell off the train before it happens.’¹

Al-Nashiri has been detained arbitrarily in US military custody at Guantánamo Bay since September 2006. In October 2019, his UK-based lawyers lodged a complaint with the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT), alleging that there is ‘credible evidence that the UK Agencies and/or their employees, servants and/or agents aided and abetted and/or were complicit and/or conspired with the US authorities in the torture and ill-treatment of Mr Al-Nashiri, including by providing questions and/or information to US officials to be put to Mr Al-Nashiri during interrogation, while being aware/the circumstances being such that they ought to have been aware, that Mr Al-Nashiri was being subjected to torture and/or ill-treatment.’²

Indeed, this form of UK involvement has been found by the Intelligence and Security Committee to have taken place in the case of other so-called High-Value Detainees held and tortured in CIA black sites. For example, British intelligence officials were aware from early on that Abu Zubaydah, the first man to be held as part of the CIA’s torture programme, was being ‘subjected to some harsh interrogation techniques, including sleep deprivation, and that it was considered that 98 per cent of US Special Forces would have broken if subject to the same conditions.’ Nonetheless, the Agencies continued to send the CIA questions to be used in his interrogations from at least May 2002 to 2006.³

Likewise, British intelligence fed questions to the CIA for use during the torture of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, despite knowledge that he was ‘being treated harshly in detention at an unknown location.’ Questions were sent to the CIA for use with Mohammed throughout March 2003, during the same time that he was being held in a secret prison in Poland, was waterboarded 183 times, and was subjected to sleep deprivation for more than seven days at a time.⁴

Given that al-Nashiri was also considered by the CIA to be a High-Value Detainee, given that he was linked to specific planned attacks against UK targets, and given that he was held for lengthy periods alongside both Abu Zubaydah and Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, al-Nashiri’s legal team have argued that it is:

‘inconceivable that UK engagement with CIA interrogation was limited to those individuals named in the Parliamentary Committee Report. There is an irresistible inference that the UK Agencies participated in intelligence sharing in relation to the Complainant and were complicit in his torture and ill-treatment.’⁵

Although, when considering the preliminary issue of jurisdiction, the Tribunal found that al-Nashiri did not fall within the scope of the European Convention on Human Rights or the Human Rights Act,⁶ it ultimately allowed a complaint to proceed under section 65(2)(b) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. In doing so, the Tribunal was motivated not least by its consideration that ‘the underlying issues are of the gravest possible kind’ and that therefore ‘it would be in the public interest for these issues to be considered by this Tribunal.’⁷

Building on our larger investigation into the CIA torture programme, published in our report CIA Torture Unredacted,⁸ this briefing provides an account of Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri’s time in secret CIA detention, including the severe torture he experienced and his forcible transfer (rendition) between at least nine locations between 2002-2006.

Waterboarding and tiny boxes: secret detention and torture in Afghanistan and Thailand

Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was captured in Dubai in mid-October 2002, although the precise date, location and details of the capture are still unclear.⁹ According to al-Nashiri, he was detained and interrogated by Emirati agents for the first month after his capture.¹⁰ He was then rendered to the black site in Afghanistan known as the ‘Dark Prison’ (referred to by the SSCI study as DETENTION SITE COLBALT), with one CIA cable describing al-Nashiri as ‘tearful and distressed’ during his transfer.¹¹

Once in Afghanistan, al-Nashiri says his wrists were tied to a bar in the ceiling, and he was kept naked in a painful position with his feet just touching the floor.¹² He was held at the site for five days, from 10-15 November 2002, and then rendered again to the CIA black site in Thailand (referred to by the SSCI study as DETENTION SITE GREEN).¹³

This black site was the first to be opened under the CIA programme, and held just two detainees during its period of operation: Abu Zubaydah, the CIA’s first detainee, captured in March 2002, and al-Nashiri. The black site had no permanent staff, with temporary duty officers taking up the position of Chief of Base as well as security, medical and communications personnel. Interrogations of the two men were led by the two contracted psychologists/interrogators, James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen, who the CIA had employed to develop and oversee the interrogation programme.¹⁴

The site’s precise location is still unclear. It has been reported as being at least an hour’s drive from Bangkok, although others have suggested locations in the provinces of Udon Thani or Chiang Mai, both of which are much further away.¹⁵ It has also been reported as being located in a small, disused warehouse on an active airbase, and it appears as though this was within, or adjacent to, a city.¹⁶ Ali Soufan, an FBI agent who was present at the site and initially interviewed Abu Zubaydah there as well as in a nearby hospital, gives a sparse description: it was a ‘very primitive location’ which had a ‘safe house’ and a ‘makeshift hospital room.’ Soufan reached the facility on a small plane after arriving in the host country.¹⁷

Other reporting has confirmed that the facility was makeshift, with one senior CIA official acknowledging that ‘it was just a chicken coop we remodelled.’¹⁸ Despite its initial primitive state, the site was transformed over the next couple of weeks into ‘an actual cell… monitored by hidden cameras and microphones’.¹⁹ A fuller picture of the conditions of confinement at the site emerges from CIA cables sent during April 2002, after Abu Zubaydah had been moved back to the facility following a period in a local hospital. The cell was described as ‘white with no natural lighting or windows, but with four halogen lights pointed into the cell. An air conditioner was also in the room. A white curtain separated the interrogation room from the cell. The interrogation cell had three padlocks.’ Security personnel wore ‘all black uniforms, including boots, gloves, balaclavas, and goggles to keep Abu Zubaydah from identifying the officers, as well as to prevent Abu Zubaydah from seeing the security guards as individuals who he may attempt to establish a relationship or dialogue with.’ The officers used ‘hand signals when they were with Abu Zubaydah and used hand-cuffs and leg shackles to maintain control. In addition, either loud rock music was played or noise generators were used to enhance Abu Zubaydah’s “sense of hopelessness”.’²⁰ These modifications – which included ‘the sanding of the holding cell bars to reduce AZ’s ability to stimulate his sensorium via rubbing of the bars’ – were designed, according to the interrogation team, specifically ‘to create an atmosphere that enhances the strategic interrogation process of AZ. The deliberate manipulation of the environment is intended to cause psychological disorientation, and… an increased sense of learned helplessness.’²¹

Al-Nashiri was detained at the Thai black site for nearly three weeks, alongside Abu Zubaydah. He has testified that he was kept naked and shackled, and was ‘threatened with sodomy, and with the arrest and rape of his family.’²² By this point, Gina Haspel (who later became Director of the CIA) was in post as Chief of Base for the Thai site, and oversaw al-Nashiri’s torture.²³ CIA records document his torture at this site, including the use of the waterboard on multiple occasions from 27 November onwards.²⁴ Authorisation for this was granted for use immediately upon al-Nashiri’s arrival, and was conducted by Mitchell and Jessen, who had ‘successfully used these measures against Abu Zubaydah.’²⁵ Cables document al-Nashiri’s torture in some detail, including the use of confinement boxes and the waterboard over a number of days.²⁶ According to al-Nashiri himself, ‘There was a box half meter by half meter. It was two meters in height. They used to put me inside the box. I was standing in that box for about a week and I couldn’t do anything. My feet were swollen. My nails were about to fall off.’²⁷

By December 2002, the cables relating to al-Nashiri’s torture had taken on an absurd theatricality. One noted that interrogators and linguists ‘strode, catlike, into the well-lit confines of the cell at 0902hrs. [Redacted] deftly removed the subject’s black hood with a swipe, paused, and in a deep measured voice said that subject… should reveal what subject had done to vex his guards to the point of rage.’²⁸

Guidance from Headquarters, issued in December 2002, instructed the black sites to ‘fully document in advance any decisions to employ any enhanced techniques’, in order to evidence ‘good faith’ that there was no specific intent to cause ‘severe physical or mental pain or suffering’ (i.e., torture) during these sessions. Furthermore, the guidance continued, ‘the critical need for such documentation is reinforced by the concern that a detainee may suffer a heart attack, for example, and die in the course of his detention. The documentation serves a number of functions, not the least of which is to protect the officers on our interrogation teams.’²⁹ Ultimately, however, the videotapes of the torture of Abu Zubaydah and al-Nashiri were destroyed, with one CIA email making clear that ‘the heat from destroying is nothing compared to what it would be if the tapes ever got into public domain… out of context, they would make us look terrible; it would be devastating to us.’³⁰

The torture continued until 4 December 2002, at which point he was rendered alongside Abu Zubaydah to the newly-opened Polish black site (referred to by the SSCI study as DETENTION SITE BLUE).³¹ Both Mitchell and Jessen accompanied them, in order to ‘ensure continuity to the interrogation/debriefing process.’³²

Handguns and power drills: secret detention and torture in Poland

The Polish site consisted of two buildings within a military intelligence training base, located in the woods outside the village of Stare Kiejkuty in the lakes region of north-eastern Poland. It has been reported that the CIA paid at least $300,000 for improvements at the site, including the installation of security cameras and the conversion of the two buildings. One of these was a two-storey villa, the other a shed. Both were used to detain prisoners, and there was also a gym for detainees to use a treadmill or exercise bike if they proved cooperative. Polish officials provided perimeter security for the site, as well as operational security during prisoner transfers to and from the airport at Szymany (13 miles from the site). They could visit the staff canteen, although they had no access to the prisoners.³³

The facility was initially intended to hold a maximum of two high-value detainees, but a lack of detention facilities elsewhere led to the construction of five cells. Three of these were purpose-built ‘holding units’, and it may be that the other two were cages supplied by a local contractor.³⁴ By April 2003 these cells were full, and officers were concerned that it had become overcrowded.³⁵ There were also ongoing tensions with local authorities, who were clearly aware of the activities taking place on Polish soil. Local officials proposed a written Memorandum of Understanding with the CIA, delineating relative roles and responsibilities, which the CIA refused to sign. In turn, the Polish authorities refused to approve the transfer of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed to the site in March, a decision that was only overturned after diplomatic intervention by the US ambassador. Ultimately, a multi-million payment by the CIA to its Polish counterparts appears to have smoothed relations, and the political leadership in the country from that point ‘was now flexible with regard to the number of CIA detainees at the facility and when the facility would eventually be closed.’³⁶

The Polish site was run by a Chief of Base who ‘oversaw interrogations and debriefings, released cables and reports, and communicated daily with the local Station and Headquarters.’³⁷ There were half a dozen or so security personnel at the facility,³⁸ and these were responsible for monitoring detainees and the site perimeter, maintaining detainee records, and preparing three meals daily for the detainees ‘which generally consisted of beans, rice, cheese sandwiches, vitamins, fruit, water, and Ensure nutritional supplement’.³⁹ One CIA review of its black sites, conducted in early 2003, concluded that prisoners in Poland ‘received bi-weekly medical evaluations, brushed their teeth once a day, washed their hands prior to each meal, and could bathe once a week. Amenities such as solid food, clothing (sweatshirts, sweatpants, and slippers), reading materials, prayer rugs, and Korans were available depending on the detainee’s degree of cooperation with interrogators.’⁴⁰

Although the conditions of confinement appear to have been a slight improvement on the dungeon-like conditions in Afghanistan, torture at the site was routine. The Chief of Base participated in the torture of al-Nashiri during December 2002 and January 2003, alongside an untrained and unqualified interrogator referred to by the SSCI as CIA OFFICER 2 (about whom there were significant concerns, given his temper and ‘security issues’.)⁴¹ Al-Nashiri was subjected to sustained torture during four discrete periods in December and January,⁴² which involved being placed in a standing stress position for days, followed by a mock execution with a hand gun and the use of a cordless power drill. According to an internal investigation into these incidents by the CIA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG), as the officer racked the handgun and pointed the barrel at al-Nashiri’s temple, al-Nashiri began to cry. Later, when the power drill was revved, ‘al-Nashiri stood naked and hooded; he flinched and shook, but did not cry.’⁴³ He was placed in stress positions so extreme that a medical officer had to intervene due to concerns that his shoulders would dislocate.⁴⁴

Later interrogation plans for al-Nashiri, drafted by Bruce Jessen, prompted concerns to be expressed at Headquarters. One cable, drafted by the CIA’s chief of interrogations to the Polish site, made clear that ‘we have serious reservations with the continued used of enhanced techniques with Nashiri (subject) and its long term impact on him. Subject has been held for three months in very difficult conditions, both physically and mentally…. Continued enhanced methods may push subject over the edge psychologically.’⁴⁵ On the same day, the CIA’s chief of interrogations announced his early retirement, given his severe concerns over the torture programme: ‘This morning I informed the front office of CTC that I will no longer be associated in any way with the interrogation program due to serious reservation I have about the current state of affairs. Instead, I will be retiring shortly. This is a train wreak (sic) waiting to happen and I intend to get the hell off the train before it happens.’⁴⁶

Further rendition, secret detention and torture

Al-Nashiri was held in Poland until June 2003, before being rendered alongside another detainee, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, to a facility in Morocco considered to be a ‘temporary patch’ while discussions continued around the construction of a permanent CIA facility in the country.⁵⁹ Al-Nashiri was held in Morocco until September 2003, before being rendered to a CIA detention facility at Guantánamo Bay.⁶⁰

Al-Nashiri was then held in secret in Guantánamo Bay until April 2004.⁶¹ By this point, CIA lawyers had become increasingly concerned at the possible implications of a forthcoming US Supreme Court ruling, which looked likely to grant habeas corpus rights to US military prisoners at Guantánamo Bay, and which might have also applied to the CIA’s own prisoners on the island. This would have made the secret prisoners both visible and eligible for legal representation if they remained on the base. As a result of these concerns, the CIA rendered all its detainees, including al-Nashiri, to other sites in its secret prison network.⁶²

At this point, al-Nashiri was rendered to the black site in Romania (referred to by the SSCI study as DETENTION SITE BLACK). CIA cables from the site document his detention and behaviour throughout 2004 and 2005, including depression, anxiety and insomnia.⁶³ In May 2004, he was subjected to rectal feeding in response to a short-lived hunger strike, with Ensure infused into al-Nashiri ‘in a forward-facing position (Trendlenberg) with head lower than torso.’⁶⁴ The final cable from the Romanian site relating to al-Nashiri is dated 30 September 2005,⁶⁵ and shortly thereafter he was rendered to Lithuania alongside another detainee held in Romania at the time, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed.

Little is known about al-Nashiri’s treatment in Lithuania, although one CIA cable from the site documents his detention there.⁶⁶ He was held at the site for over five months, until it was closed in March 2006.⁶⁷ At that point, all CIA prisoners at the site – including al-Nashiri, Khaled Sheikh Mohammed, Mustafa al-Hawsawi, Ammar al-Baluchi and Abu Zubaydah – were transferred to DETENTION SITE BROWN in Afghanistan.⁶⁸

CIA cables from DETENTION SITE BROWN document al-Nashiri’s presence at the site throughout summer 2006.⁶⁹ He was then transferred into US military detention in Guantánamo Bay in September 2006, as one of the 14 CIA prisoners handed over to the US Department of Defense at that time.

1. Central Intelligence Agency, Note: Re, [redacted] to [redacted], 22 Jan 2003. ↩︎
2. Investigatory Powers Tribunal, Judgment: Al-Nashiri v. Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service, GCHQ and Ministry of Defence, 21 Jun 2023, p. 5. ↩︎
3. Intelligence and Security Committee, Detainee Mistreatment and Rendition, 2001-10, parliamentary report, 28 Jun 2018, p. 42. ↩︎
4. The Rendition Project and The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, CIA Torture Unredacted, Jul 2019, p. 193. ↩︎
5. Investigatory Powers Tribunal, Skeleton Argument: Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, Al-Nashiri v. Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service, GCHQ and Ministry of Defence, 26 Apr 2023, pp. 10-12. ↩︎
6. Investigatory Powers Tribunal, Judgment: Al-Nashiri v. Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service, GCHQ and Ministry of Defence, 21 Jun 2023, p. 33. ↩︎
7. Investigatory Powers Tribunal, Decision: Al-Nashiri v. Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service, GCHQ and Ministry of Defence, 27 Oct 2023, pp. 11-12. ↩︎
8. The Rendition Project and The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, CIA Torture Unredacted, Jul 2019. ↩︎
9. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, p. 66. ↩︎
10. International Committee of the Red Cross, Report on the Treatment of Fourteen ‘High Value Detainees’ in CIA Custody, document with covering letter dated 14 Feb 2007, Geoff Loane (Head of Regional Delegation) to John Rizzo (Acting General Council, CIA), Feb 2007, p. 6. ↩︎
11. Central Intelligence Agency, Cable: Application of Enhanced Measures to Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, ALEC, [redacted] to [redacted], date redacted [11 Nov 2002]; US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, pp. 66-67. ↩︎
12. International Committee of the Red Cross, Report on the Treatment of Fourteen ‘High Value Detainees’ in CIA Custody, document with covering letter dated 14 Feb 2007, Geoff Loane (Head of Regional Delegation) to John Rizzo (Acting General Council, CIA), Feb 2007, p. 11. ↩︎
13. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, p. 67; US Department of Justice, Investigation Into the Office of Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of ‘Enhanced Interrogation Techniques’ on Suspected Terrorists, Office of Professional Responsibility, 29 Jul 2009, p. 85. ↩︎
14. Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Inspector General), Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (Sep 2001 – Oct 2003) [Ver. 2], case 2003-7123-IG, document with cover sheet, 7 May 2004, pp. 34-35. ↩︎
15. Adam Goldman, The Hidden History of the CIA’s Prison in Poland, The Washington Post, 23 Jan 2014; CIA Director Gina Haspel’s Thailand Torture Ties, BBC News, 4 May 2018; Matt Apuzzo, Sheri Fink and James Risen, How US Torture Left a Legacy of Damaged Minds, The New York Times, 9 Oct 2016. ↩︎
16. Brian Ross and Richard Esposito, Sources Tell ABC News Top al Qaeda Figures Held in Secret CIA Prisons, ABC News, 5 Dec 2005; US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, p 24. ↩︎
17. Ali Soufan, The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda, London: Allen Lane, 2011, p. 375. ↩︎
18. Adam Goldman, The Hidden History of the CIA’s Prison in Poland, The Washington Post, 23 Jan 2014; David Johnston and Mark Mazzetti, A Window Into CIA’s Embrace of Secret Jails, The New York Times, 12 Aug 2009. ↩︎
19. Ali Soufan, The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda, London: Allen Lane, 2011, p. 396. ↩︎
20. Central Intelligence Agency, Cable: Updated Interrogation Plan for Abu Zubaydah, DETENTION SITE GREEN, [redacted] to [redacted], cable 10116, 25 Apr 2002. ↩︎
21. Central Intelligence Agency, Cable: Behavioral Interrogation Team SIT Report, [redacted] to [redacted], cable 69500, 7 Apr 2002. ↩︎
22. International Committee of the Red Cross, Report on the Treatment of Fourteen ‘High Value Detainees’ in CIA Custody, document with covering letter dated 14 Feb 2007, Geoff Loane (Head of Regional Delegation) to John Rizzo (Acting General Council, CIA), Feb 2007, p. 17. ↩︎
23. Tim Golden, Stephen Engelberg and Daniel DeFraia, A Prisoner in Gina Haspel’s Black Site, ProPublica, 7 May 2018. ↩︎
24. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, p. 67; Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Inspector General), Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (Sep 2001 – Oct 2003) [Ver. 2], case 2003-7123-IG, document with cover sheet, 7 May 2004, p. 36. ↩︎
25. Central Intelligence Agency, Cable: Application of Enhanced Measures to Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, ALEC, [redacted] to [redacted], date redacted [11 Nov 2002]. ↩︎
26. Central Intelligence Agency, Cable: Details of [Redacted] Nov 2002 Debriefing of Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, DETENTION SITE GREEN, [redacted] to ALEC, cable 11246, date part redacted, [xx] Nov 2002; Central Intelligence Agency, Cable: Details of Second [Redacted] Nov 2002 Interrogation Session With Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, DETENTION SITE GREEN, [redacted] to ALEC, cable 11258, date part redacted, [xx] Nov 2002; Central Intelligence Agency, Cable: Details of [Redacted] Nov 2002 Interrogations of Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, DETENTION SITE GREEN, [redacted] to ALEC, cable 11263, date part redacted, [xx] Nov 2002; Central Intelligence Agency, Cable: Details of [Redacted] Nov 2002 Interrogation Session With Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, DETENTION SITE GREEN, [redacted] to ALEC, cable 11270, date part redacted, [xx] Nov 2002; Central Intelligence Agency, Cable: Details of [Redacted] Nov 2002 First Interrogation Session With of Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, DETENTION SITE GREEN, [redacted] to ALEC, cable 11284, date part redacted, [xx] Nov 2002. ↩︎
27. US Department of Defense, Detainee Statement: Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, Combatant Status Review Tribunal, transcript, 14 Mar 2007, p. 16. ↩︎
28. Central Intelligence Agency, Cable: Details of [Redacted] Dec 2002 Interrogation Sessions With Abd Al-Rahim Husayn Muhammad Abdu Nashir, DETENTION SITE GREEN, [redacted] to ALEC, cable 11359, date part redacted, [xx] Dec 2002. ↩︎
29. Central Intelligence Agency, Cable: Legal Background on the Use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, [redacted] to [redacted], cable number redacted, date part redacted, [xx] Dec 2002. ↩︎
30. Central Intelligence Agency, Email: Short Backgrounder, [redacted] to Dusty Foggo [redacted], 10 Nov 2005. For a detailed account of the decision to destroy the tapes, see Tim Golden, Haspel, Spies and Videotapes, ProPublica, 9 May 2018. ↩︎
31. Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Inspector General), Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (Sep 2001 – Oct 2003) [Ver. 2], case 2003-7123-IG, document with cover sheet, 7 May 2004, p. 36; US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, p. 67. ↩︎
32. Central Intelligence Agency, Cable: Transfer of Detainees From [Redacted] to [Redacted], [redacted] to Director, cable number redacted, date part redacted, [xx] 2002. See, also: Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Inspector General), Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Techniques at [Redacted], John L. Helgerson (Inspector General), case 2003-7123-IG, 29 Oct 2003, p. 2. ↩︎
33. Adam Goldman, The Hidden History of the CIA’s Prison in Poland, The Washington Post, 23 Jan 2014. ↩︎
34. Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Inspector General), Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (Sep 2001 – Oct 2003) [Ver. 2], case 2003-7123-IG, document with cover sheet, 7 May 2004, p. 38; US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, p. 62; European Court of Human Rights, Judgment: Abu Zubaydah v. Poland, 24 Jul 2014, para 297; Randy Kreider, CIA Wanted ‘Torture’ Cage for Secret Prison: Official, ABC News, 22 Jun 2012. ↩︎
35. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, p. 62; Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Inspector General), Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (Sep 2001 – Oct 2003) [Ver. 2], case 2003-7123-IG, document with cover sheet, 7 May 2004, p. 38. ↩︎
36. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, p. 74. Further reporting has suggested that the CIA paid Polish intelligence $15 million in cash (contained in two large cardboard boxes). See Adam Goldman, The Hidden History of the CIA’s Prison in Poland, The Washington Post, 23 Jan 2014. Elsewhere, one CIA official admitted during a CIA oral history interview to handing over millions of dollars in $100-dollar bills, contained in a number of boxes. This official did not name the recipient. See US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, p. 140. ↩︎
37. Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Inspector General), Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (Sep 2001 – Oct 2003) [Ver. 2], case 2003-7123-IG, document with cover sheet, 7 May 2004, p. 39. ↩︎
38. Adam Goldman, The Hidden History of the CIA’s Prison in Poland, The Washington Post, 23 Jan 2014. ↩︎
39. Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Inspector General), Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (Sep 2001 – Oct 2003) [Ver. 2], case 2003-7123-IG, document with cover sheet, 7 May 2004, p. 39. ↩︎
40. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, p. 62. ↩︎
41. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, pp. 68-70. ↩︎
42. 5-8 December 2002, 27 December 2002-1 January 2003, 9-10 January 2003, 15-27 January 2003. See US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, p. 67. ↩︎
43. Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Inspector General), Report of Investigation: Unauthorized Techniques at [Redacted], John L. Helgerson (Inspector General), case 2003-7123-IG, 29 Oct 2003, pp. 20-23. ↩︎
44. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, pp. 69-70; Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Inspector General), Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (Sep 2001 – Oct 2003) [Ver. 2], case 2003-7123-IG, document with cover sheet, 7 May 2004, pp. 41-44. ↩︎
45. Central Intelligence Agency, Memo: Concerns Over Revised Interrogation Plan for Nashiri, [redacted] to [redacted], document with attachment, 22 Jan 2003. ↩︎
46. Central Intelligence Agency, Note: Re, [redacted] to [redacted], 22 Jan 2003. ↩︎
47. The Rendition Project and The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, CIA Torture Unredacted, Jul 2019. ↩︎
48. Richmor Aviation, Invoice: SportsFlight Air, Trip 41355, 15 Nov 2002. ↩︎
49. Universal Weather and Aviation, AFTN/SITA Text for N63MU, 4-6 Dec 2002, 4 Dec 2002; Polish Border Guard Office, Letter: Landing Records for N379P, N313P and N63MU, 2002-03, Zarzad Graniczny (Director) to Danuta Prezywara (Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights), 23 Jul 2010; Szymany Airport, Landing Book, Poland, Dec 2002. ↩︎
50. Universal Weather and Aviation, Invoices: Airborne, document bundle, date range (2002-2003); AirMarketing Services, Invoice: SportsFlight Air, no. 22731, 10 Dec 2002; AirMarketing Services, Invoice: SportsFlight Air, no. 23109, 16 Jan 2003; Capital Aviation, Invoice: DynCorp Systems and Solutions, LT050602-1203, 7 Jan 2003; Capital Aviation, Payment Receipt: SportsFlight Air, Trip 24, 24 Jan 2003. ↩︎
51. Jeppesen Dataplan, AFTN/SITA Text for N379P, 5 Jun 2003, 5 Jun 2003; Szymany Airport, Landing Book, Poland, Jun 2003; Polish Border Guard Office, Letter: Landing Records for N379P, N313P and N63MU, 2002-03, Zarzad Graniczny (Director) to Danuta Prezywara (Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights), 23 Jul 2010. ↩︎
52. Jeppesen Dataplan, AFTN/SITA Text for N313P, 22 Sep 2003, 22 Sep 2003; Szymany Airport, Landing Book, Poland, Sep 2003; Polish Border Guard Office, Letter: Landing Records for N379P, N313P and N63MU, 2002-03, Zarzad Graniczny (Director) to Danuta Prezywara (Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights), 23 Jul 2010. ↩︎
53. Richmor Aviation, Invoice: SportsFlight Air, Trip 52158. ↩︎
54. [Redacted], Email: N308AB Itinerary, [redacted] to [redacted], 29 Sep 2005; Computer Sciences Corporation, Preliminary Requirements, 4-5 Oct 2005, 28 Sep 2005. ↩︎
55. Baseops, AFTN/SITA Text for N787WH, 5-6 Oct 2005, 5 Oct 2005. ↩︎
56. Lithuanian Civilines Aviacijos Administracija, Letter: Landing Records for N8213G, N961BW, N724CL and N787WH, 2003-05, Kestutis Auryla (Director) to Lydia Medland (Access Info Europe), 20 Jun 2011; Vilnius Airport, Ground Handling Form, Lithuania, 6 Oct 2005. ↩︎
57. SportsFlight Air, Invoice: CSC, LTS050602-10038, 12 Oct 2005; SportsFlight Air, Invoice: CSC, LTS050602-10046, 12 Oct 2005; Computer Sciences Corporation and SportsFlight Air, Subcontract Task Order Modification, Subcontract S1008117, Task Order 53, 25 Oct 2005; Computer Sciences Corporation and SportsFlight Air, Subcontract Task Order Modification, Subcontract S1008117, Task Order 54, 25 Oct 2005. ↩︎
58. Miami Air International, AFTN/SITA Text for N733MA, 25 Mar 2006, 25 Mar 2006; SportsFlight Air, Invoice: CSC, LTS050602-0666, 30 Mar 2006; Miami Air International and SportsFlight Air, Flight Schedule, Contract M1195.06.02, 27 Mar 2006. ↩︎
59. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, p. 139; Adam Goldman, Secret Jails: Terror Suspect’s Odyssey Through CIA’s ‘Black Sites’, Associated Press, 2010. ↩︎
60. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, p. 140; Central Intelligence Agency, cable 1756, 19 Sep 2003, 08:00; Central Intelligence Agency, cable 1091, 3 Nov 2003, 18:35. ↩︎
61. Central Intelligence Agency, cable 1091, 3 Nov 2003, 18:35; Central Intelligence Agency, cable 1150, 28 Nov 2003, 20:19; Central Intelligence Agency, cable 1266, 5 Jan 2004, 23:09; Central Intelligence Agency, cable 1630, 27 Mar 2004, 14:40. ↩︎
62. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, p. 141; Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, CIA Flight Carried Secret from Gitmo, Associated Press, 7 August 2010. ↩︎
63. See, for example: Central Intelligence Agency, cable 1356, 1 Jul 2004, 16:44; Central Intelligence Agency, cable 1543, 11 Aug 2004, 16:00; Central Intelligence Agency, cable 1716, 18 Sep 2004, 07:42; Central Intelligence Agency, cable 1959, 11 Dec 2004, 17:00; Central Intelligence Agency, cable 2038, 21 Jan 2005, 15:58; Central Intelligence Agency, cable 2474, 25 Jun 2005, 16:22; Central Intelligence Agency, cable 2673, 2 Aug 2005, 14:51; Central Intelligence Agency, cable 3051, 30 Sep 2005, 12:35. ↩︎
64. Central Intelligence Agency, cable 1203, 23 May 2004, 17:09. ↩︎
65. Central Intelligence Agency, cable 3051, 30 Sep 2005, 12:35. ↩︎
66. Central Intelligence Agency, cable 3910, 24 Jan 2006, 18:52. ↩︎
67. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, p. 154. ↩︎
68. US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, 9 Dec 2014, pp. 96, 154. ↩︎
69. Central Intelligence Agency, cable 1029, 29 June 2006, 17:50; Central Intelligence Agency, cable 1142, 4 Aug 2006, 13:58; Central Intelligence Agency, cable 1242, 5 Sep 2006, 07:44. ↩︎