BRIEFING:

UK Special Forces War Crimes: Senior Officers, 2010-13

Senior UK Special Forces officers – up to and including Director Special Forces – were aware from at least 2010-11 of the mounting evidence of war crimes carried out by units deployed to Afghanistan, as well as the fabricated reporting designed to cover up these crimes. This briefing provides an account of the key personnel who had contemporaneous knowledge of what appeared at the time to be systematic unlawful killings, and yet who universally failed to refer matters to the Service Police.

It is now clear that, from at least 2010-11, a large number of senior personnel within UK Special Forces (UKSF) headquarters, in both the UK and Afghanistan, were aware of the mounting evidence of unlawful killings carried out by units deployed to Afghanistan as part of the counterinsurgency campaign. In addition, these officers were aware of evidence that the post-operational paperwork was being routinely fabricated in order to cover up these crimes.

Throughout 2010 and 2011, senior officers discussed the emerging evidence of war crimes being conducted by UKSF units on the ground, and at a number of points Director Special Forces was made explicitly aware of this evidence. Indeed, by September 2010 officers had created an ‘incident tracker’ after a noted upswing in killings during night raids. By February 2011, officers were were discussing their serious concerns about the disproportionate number of people killed on operations as compared to the number of weapons recovered, and the ‘logic defying’ accounts provided by the units conducting them. Officers who read the accounts spoke to each other, at the time, of ‘execution’, ‘massacres’, ‘assassinations’ and a ‘casual disregard for life, COIN principles and credible reporting.’ They were clear that ‘you couldn’t MAKE IT UP!’, and that this was ‘a massive failure of leadership. If we don’t believe this, then no one else will and when the next Wikileaks occurs then we will be dragged down with them.’ Others questioned ‘why are we the only ones who see this bollocks for what it is?’ and noted that ‘murder and the [UKSF unit] have oft been regular bed-fellows.’

Related Briefing
UK Special Forces: Operations, 2010-13

In addition, officers who had spoken with members of the UKSF unit deployed to Afghanistan in early 2011 reported that there was an unofficial policy at play whereby all fighting-aged males were being killed ‘on target’ during night raids in Afghanistan, regardless of the threat they posed. In one case, it was said that ‘a pillow was placed over the head of a detainee before he was killed with a pistol.’ This account was communicated up the chain of command to the very top, where the allegations were felt to be more than rumour and ‘malicious speculation’. Indeed, it led to the creation in April 2011 of a classified ‘security compartment’ at a senior level within UKSF, designed to hold evidence that UKSF units had been conducting extrajudicial killings in Afghanistan. Moreover, advice provided at the time by the senior legal advisor at headquarters made clear that ‘it is arguable that when all these cases are taken together and there is an identification of similar trends and suspicion over the credibility of the accounts given in the [post-operational paperwork] then the circumstances are such that a reasonable person would consider that service offences may have been committed.’ Should that have been the case, as the legal advisor was suggesting, then there would have been a clear legal duty upon senior officers to refer matters to the Service Police. This message went to the very top of UKSF, with Director Special Forces receiving a number of written and verbal briefings from senior officers which outlined in some detail their concerns.

Notwithstanding the contemporaneous knowledge at the highest levels of UKSF in relation to the emerging evidence of systematic war crimes, and notwithstanding the advice provided by the senior legal advisor in relation to referral to the Service Police, no one from within UKSF made that referral. Indeed, the information gathered and held in the security compartment was not passed to the Service Police until several years later, in April 2015, after a senior UKSF officer proactively approached the Royal Military Police (RMP).

This briefing provides an evolving account of those senior UKSF officers who had contemporaneous knowledge of apparent systematic unlawful killings by units in Afghanistan, and yet who appear to have universally failed to refer matters to the Service Police at the time. Our work is based on documents disclosed and made public during the Saifullah judicial review, documents and information made public as part of the ongoing Independent Inquiry Relating to Afghanistan and gathered by our team, as well as public reporting by investigative journalists. We have adopted here the ciphers which are used by the Inquiry when referring to individual UKSF personnel, given the requirement to preserve their anonymity. These ciphers are mainly four-digit numbers preceded by the letter ‘N’ (for example, N1466). The exception to this is for the small number of topmost officers who have been named during the Inquiry itself and in reporting by national media such as the BBC.

UKSF Headquarters (UK)

Maj Gen ‘Jacko’ Page, Director Special Forces (2009-12)

Major General (now Lieutenant General) Jonathan ‘Jacko’ Page was Director Special Forces (DSF) from 2009 to February 2012. During this time, he was in overall operational command of all UKSF personnel and operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Documents referred to in the Inquiry have Page ciphered as ‘N1802, Comd HHQ(UK)’, although his real name has been mentioned during proceedings and is widely reported elsewhere.

Page was clearly aware of the evidence in relation to possible war crimes being committed by units under his command. The RMP was investigating at least one allegation of murder throughout 2011, under the codename Operation Pavo, and Page would have been informed of this fact and provided with regular updates. Moreover, as early as February 2011, Page was informed by his Assistant Chief of Staff, N1466, of concerns circulating in relation to the ‘disproportionate number of Enemy Killed in Action (EKIA) versus the number of weapons recovered,’ and the overall ‘upward trend in statistics on EKIA.’

By April 2011, N1466 had written to Page to let him know of allegations of a ‘deliberate policy among the current [unit] to engage and kill fighting-aged males on target even when they did not pose a threat.’ N1785, the Commanding Officer of the unit referred to by the Inquiry as UKAF3, also wrote to Page at this time. The allegations related specifically to the units operating in Afghanistan, and included ‘the deliberate killing of individuals after they have been restrained by [the unit] and the subsequent fabrication of evidence to suggest a lawful killing in self-defence.’ As N1785 wrote, ‘if [UKSF] individuals are conducting EJK’s (sic) then the implications are stark.’

Despite these concerns, Page did not refer the matter to the Service Police. Instead, he commissioned an internal review of the ‘tactic, technique or procedure’ (TTP) of sending Afghan men back into compounds after they were cleared by UKSF. The terms of reference for the review were clearly dictated by Page himself, with the Commander making ‘word-by-word changes’ to the text before ‘authorising [their] release’. Crucially, the review was to be conducted on the premise that the killings themselves were lawful and had been accurately recorded by UKSF, even if they had led to some disquiet amongst Afghan partner forces. As the terms stated, ‘there have been several instances in which [UKSF units] have been forced to engage and kill the nominated Afghan make because he had reached for a concealed weapon in the accommodation area, either as he returned into the compound or during the clearance phase.’ At no point was the review asked to explore the possibility of systematic criminality which appeared to be characterising night raids at that time, allegations of which had prompted the review in the first place. Although some later suggested that Page was sending a ‘thinly veiled coded message’ to the units to ‘stop their activities’, he ultimately wrote to UKSF units in Afghanistan to endorse ‘the compound clearance TTP as it was originally devised.’

Suspicious killings by UKSF in Afghanistan continued to accumulate throughout 2011, as Page was in post as DSF. Indeed, overall, more than 70 Afghan men and boys were killed by UKSF in suspicious circumstances during his time in command. Despite the fact that senior officers at headquarters were clearly aware of the regularity of operations resulting in suspicious deaths, at no point did Page refer any of the matters to the Service Police.

Maj Gen Mark Carleton-Smith, Director Special Forces (2012-15)

Major General (now General) Mark Carleton-Smith was in post as DSF from February 2012 to 2015. During this time, at least 13 Afghan boys and men were killed in suspicious circumstances in operations conducted by UKSF in Afghanistan. Documents referred to in the Inquiry have Carleton-Smith ciphered as ‘Witness P’, although his real name has been mentioned during proceedings and is widely reported elsewhere, including on the UK Government’s website.

In at least one of these operations, where four people were killed where they were sleeping and two preschool children were severely injured, a Serious Incident Review (SIR) was completed by UKSF. Given the UK military protocol in relation to SIRs, it is clear that Carleton-Smith would have had final sign-off of the review. However, despite the fact that very young children were casualties, and despite the fact that the unit claimed to have recovered only one weapon (a grenade), the SIR did not result in a referral to the Royal Military Police for investigation of possible criminality. Responding to the BBC’s questions in 2022, Carleton-Smith claimed that he could not recall whether he was briefed about the ‘specific tactical detail of the operation’, although he was clear that the Commanding Officer in Afghanistan had told him that there was no evidence of a criminal offence and that the Rules of Engagement had not been broken. Given that those killed appear to have been unarmed, it is not clear what investigation took place to assess the accuracy of the evidence provided by those undertaking the operation.

Carleton-Smith has also claimed that, on appointment as DSF, he was told by UKSF headquarters staff of the ‘TTP review’ in 2011, undertaken in response to a potential upswing in casualties during night raids, but was not told of any concerns in relation to unlawful killings:

Although I knew [N1802], [N1785], [N1466] and [N1788] well in 2011-2012 and remained in touch with them professionally for some years, none of them has ever raised any of these matters with me. Nor did [N1803], who was in post as ACOS (Pol) during part of my tenure as [Commander].

It remains to be seen whether Carleton-Smith’s account is correct. If it is, then a number of senior UKSF officers, including his predecessor as DSF (‘Jacko’ Page), failed to make him aware of the evidence of scores of potential extrajudicial killings carried out by units under his overall command.

N2252, Chief of Staff

N2252 was Chief of Staff (COS) at the UK Special Forces headquarters in London during 2010-11. He was clearly aware of concerns relating to the Deliberate Detention Operations being carried out by UKSF during early 2011 and raised this directly with colleagues on a number of occasions. For example, emails disclosed by the Ministry of Defence show that, immediately following the 9 February 2011 operation in which eight people were killed in Musa Qala (including a 15-year old boy Mohammad Taher), N2252 wrote to the Senior Legal Advisor at UKSF headquarters in London, N2108, alerting him to yet ‘another one of “more bodies than weapons”.’

Likewise, hours after the operation on 16 February 2011 targeting Saddam Hussein (Objective Tyburn), which had resulted in four men being killed by the UKSF unit in suspicious circumstances, N2252 had seen the reporting and emailed N2108 again: ‘4 EKIA – 2 weapons recovered. Worth a look?’ He then spoke directly with his superior, DSF ‘Jacko’ Page, about this operation.

While N2252 was clearly concerned about possible extrajudicial killings by UKSF, at no point did he refer the allegations to the Service Police.

N1466, Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations)

N1466 was Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations) at the UK Special Forces headquarters in London during 2010-11. As such, he was responsible for all UKSF operations, at home and overseas, and had access to all of the post-operational paperwork generated by UKSF units operating in Afghanistan. By February 2011, he was becoming concerned at the ‘disproportionate number of Enemy Killed in Action (EKIA) versus the number of weapons recovered.’ He was, in particular, sceptical of the accounts provided in the post-operational reports, which he later described as ‘logic defying’. He spoke with his superior, Director Special Forces, flagging these concerns and the overall ‘upward trend in statistics on EKIA.’

Through February and March 2011, N1466 maintained a close watch on the post-incident reporting in Afghanistan, with a particular eye on the numbers killed and the number of weapons recovered. As he later recalled when interviewed by the RMP, the numbers were ‘disproportionate which just increased my concern that perhaps things were out of control.’

By late March 2011, confirmatory information had started to emerge from a completely different direction: N1785, the Commanding Officer of the UKSF unit referred to by the Inquiry as UKAF3, spoke with N1466 during a social event, raising information he has received from one of his own officers about recent operations in Afghanistan, suggesting that it may have been that a ‘deliberate policy was being demonstrated where all fighting aged males in a given scenario were killed irrespective of whether they posed a threat or not.’ Around this time, N1466 seems to have approached the Senior Legal Advisor, N2108, for advice in relation to ‘when there is an obligation on a CO to report matters to the Service Police to investigate allegations.’ In turn, N2108 was clear that ‘it is arguable that when all these cases are taken together and there is an identification of similar trends and suspicion developing over the credibility of the accounts given in the [post-operational paperwork] then the circumstances are such that a reasonable person would consider that service offences may have been committed.’ In other words, the Senior Legal Advisor to UK Special Forces informed N1466 that the obligation to refer matters to the Service Police was likely triggered in this situation.

With this legal advice to hand, N1466 outlined his concerns to DSF, making it clear that the allegations – if true – would demonstrate that the UKSF units in Afghanistan ‘have strayed into indefensible ethical and legal behaviour’ and suggesting ‘deeper investigation, hopefully to put minds at rest… or at worst case to put a stop to criminal behaviour.

N1466 continued to hold the view that ‘there were clear examples of questionable conduct by members of UK Special Forces and it would be for [DSF] to direct what the response should be.’ Alongside the letter, he gave a verbal briefing of his concerns to DSF, who directed that an internal review be undertaken. In turn, N1466 charged the Senior Operational Advisor, N1788, to undertake this review, and compile a number of indicative incidents of concern.

However, notwithstanding these concerns, nor the legal advice provided, N1466 did not refer matters to the Service Police. He also does not appear to have urged DSF to do the same.

N1803, Assistant Chief of Staff (Policy)

Between at least 2010-12, N1803 was Assistant Chief of Staff (Policy) at UKSF headquarters in London, responsible for advising on all matters of policy regarding UKSF. As part of the role, N1803 had access to the routine reporting of operations and often read those documents. N1803 was clearly aware of the emerging concerns at headquarters in relation to UKSF operations in Afghanistan, and claims to have had ‘concerns regarding the TTP and the concern that it might fall outside the remit of the Rules of Engagement.’ Indeed, at one point in April 2011, having read an operational report from the unit in Afghanistan, N1803 pointed out that this was the ‘First time for a while I’ve seen the “ask B to go back in to help clear and end up killing him” routine.’ In particular, N1803 asked questions about the TTP because of the UK’s responsibility to detainees.

Despite these concerns in relation to possible violations of the Rules of Engagement and the legal responsibility to protect detainees, N1803 did not refer matters to the Service Police. According to Mark Carleton-Smith, N1803 also did not tell him about the evidence of criminality amongst UKSF units when he took up the role of DSF in February 2012. This was despite N1803 still being in post as Assistant Chief of Staff.

N2108 was the most senior lawyer (SO1 Legal) at UKSF headquarters in London, 2010-11, and the principal legal advisor to DSF and other senior officers. N2108 was aware from early on that UKSF operations in Afghanistan were resulting in suspicious deaths. In email conversations in February 2011 with N2252, the Chief of Staff and second-in-command of UKSF, N2108 stated that he was aware of ‘a recent trend I think of the ‘xo bodies’ with ‘x minus 3 weapons.’’ The following week, he noted that:

I share [DSF’s] concerns about the recent spate of high EKIA and have noted the emerging TB [Taliban] TTP [Tactics, Techniques and Procedures] of supposedly hiding grenades behind curtains. This may be entirely appropriate but I get the sense that the way we are writing these up will not bear scrutiny in years to come – my comments are demonstrations of the kinds of things that Public Interest lawyers may undoubtedly raise in the inevitable public inquiries. How do we highlight our concerns in a fashion that does not constrain our people to use force legally when under threat? This HQ can order an SIR [serious incident review] if we feel that the ROE have not been followed. However I think we should tread carefully on this.

By April 2011, N2108 was being asked for his legal opinion on the obligation to report potential offences under the Armed Forces Act 2006. The threshold was, he pointed out, ‘a pretty low bar’ and ‘when all these cases are taken together and there is an identification of similar trends and suspicion developing over the credibility of the accounts given in the OPSUMs then the circumstances are such that a reasonable person would consider that service offences may have been committed.’

Despite the legal advice he was providing at the time, N2108 did not refer matters to the Service Police.

N1788, Senior Operational Advisor

N1788 was the Senior Operational Advisor (SO1 Campaigns) at UKSF headquarters in London during 2010-11. As such, he was responsible for the daily management of all issues relating to UKSF operations in a campaigning context. Crucially, he had also previously been the Officer Commanding of ‘SU1’, the UKSF unit conducting counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan.

N1788 was clearly part of the conversations at UKSF headquarters amongst senior officers who were concerned about the reporting from Afghanistan. Moreover, in April 2011 he was tasked with undertaking the TTP Review, as set out by DSF. He travelled to Afghanistan on 14 April for a number of days to interview members of the UKSF unit, flying from the UK alongside N1141, who at that time was the current Officer Commanding of the unit.

N1788 was clearly keen to limit his investigation to the question of whether the TTP needed adaptation in order to avoid situations whereby insurgents posed a threat, rather than investigating the accumulating evidence of criminality. It is clear that N1788 did not seek to conduct an investigatory interview with N1141 or any other UKSF personnel. Instead, he held a series of informal conversations. N1141 apparently ‘had no concerns with the TTP being used and was unaware that there was a potential problem with its employment.’ N1788 then ‘explained to N1141 that whilst measures taken to improve force protection were understandable, there was both a professional and presentational issue with a scenario in which having gained control of the target premises and its associated personnel, one subsequently lost that control to the point where the previously detained insurgent could pose a threat…I asked him if things could be done in a more effective way. N1141 seemed surprised, but took on board my perspective.’ N1788 also spoke to a number of the call-sign commanders collectively, all of whom ‘agreed with the opinion of N1141’, ‘voiced their concern over the poor performance’ of the Afghan Special Forces units they were partnering with, and ‘thought they were doing a good job and that their TTPs were appropriate.’

N2444, SO2 Campaigns

Working under N1788 during 2010-11, N2444 was part of the UK headquarters team overseeing operations in a campaigning context. After N1466 had approached DSF with his concerns in April 2011, N2444 was tasked by N1788 to conduct a desktop review of UKSF operations in Afghanistan since December 2010. His task was to see if there were ‘any anomalies’ in the post-operational paperwork, ‘such as enemy being killed following a compound being secured… and whether there was an abnormal ratio of EKIA to weapons recovered.’

N2444 then ‘pored through the [redacted] OPSUMs.’ He concluded that: ‘when looked at individually these operations do not stand out, it is when they are viewed collectively that patterns can be seen and my suspicions that the TTP was being abused comes to light.’ The results of his review were emailed to N1788 with a cover note, making it clear that ‘in my view there is enough here to convince me that we are getting some things wrong right now.’

N2272, Campaigns

N2272 was based within UKSF headquarters in London, in a campaigns role. He was on multiple email chains in 2011 regarding the conduct of UKSF and the serious concerns raised by an international organisation in relation to specific operations.

N1785, Commander, UKAF3 (to Apr 2011)

In 2010-11, N1785 was Commander of the UKSF unit ciphered in the Inquiry as UKAF3. In March 2011, he became aware of allegations in relation to war crimes by UKSF units in Afghanistan after a junior officer, N1799, had spoken with UKAF3’s Chief of Staff, N2349, and relayed a conversation he had had with another officer, N1201. That officer had told him that ‘members of [the UKSF unit] whilst serving in Afghanistan had been indiscriminately killing people on targets that they were striking… they would kill all males on target whether they posed a threat or not.’ N2349 spoke with N1785, who then spoke directly with N1799. The junior officer confirmed to N1785 that he had received disturbing information which could have a ‘detrimental effect on the possible reputation of the UK Special Forces.’ N1785 thereafter directed N1799 to provide a written statement, which he did on 24 March 2011:

During conversations with a [soldier] from [the UKSF unit] he stated that it was standard procedure to deploy regularly to hit Low and Medium Value Targets in the Helmand area. During these operations it was said that ‘all fighting age males are killed on target’ regardless of the threat they posed, this included those not holding weapons. It was also indicated that fighting age males were being executed on target inside compounds using a variety of methods after they had been restrained. In one case it was mentioned a pillow was put over the head of an individual being killed with a pistol. It was implied that photos would be taken of the deceased alongside weapons that the ‘fighting age male’ may not have had in their position (sic) when they were killed. The conversation implied that the intention of regular operations was to pacify areas in Helmand by destroying all the medium and low level Taliban Command chain and facilitators, using any means possible.

N1785 stored this statement in a controlled access security compartment, a classified file that limited access to the whistleblower testimony to a small number of officers within UKSF. The compartment was designed specifically to hold ‘anecdotal evidence suggesting EJK have been carried out by [UKSF] in Afghanistan,’ and was established in order to ‘provide an additional level of control over the handling and briefing of the more sensitive aspects of this matter’, the dissemination of which ‘could cause severe damage to the reputation of [UKSF].’

Memo: Allegations of EJK by UKSF
UK Special Forces, N1785 (Commanding Officer, UKSF3) to Jonathan Page (Director Special Forces), 2 pages, 5 Apr 2011

Before departing to take up his new role as UKSF Commanding Officer, Afghanistan, N1785 also wrote directly to his own commanding officer, DSF, under the subject line ‘ALLEGATIONS OF EJK BY UKSF’:

My apologies for not raising this with you during my leaving call, but I was still formulating my thoughts and our truncated meeting didn’t seem the right moment. I have for some time been aware of rumours within the [UKSF] that [units] have been conducting summary executions of supposed Taliban affiliates on target in AFG. Until very recently I have not reported this any further and cautioned my team against peddling malicious speculation. However, I have now been given more information of a nature which makes me seriously concerned for the reputation of [UKSF]. One of my team, an officer, has been told by an individual from [the unit] that there is in effect an unofficial policy amongst the [unit] to kill wherever possible fighting aged males on target, regardless of the immediate threat they pose to our troops. In some instances this has involved the deliberate killing of individuals after they have been restrained by [the unit] and the subsequent fabrication of evidence to suggest a lawful killing in self defence.

What I have been told does not amount to anything as substantial as evidence. But to my sense it is more than just what had been, until recently, vacuous rumour. But if [UKSF] individuals are conducting EJK’s (sic) then the implications are stark. Notwithstanding this, I feel most strongly that thorough appropriate investigation is warranted.

Although N1785 informed his successor as Commanding Officer of UKAF3, N2224, of the secret file and gave him a copy of the memo he had sent to DSF, at no time did he inform the Service Police of these matters.

The BBC has reported that N1785 is in fact General Gwyn Jenkins, who is now the Vice Chief of Defence Staff and as such the second most senior officer in the British armed forces. They have also reported that Jenkins was Commanding Officer of the Special Boat Service (SBS), the sister unit to the SAS, in early 2011.

N2224, Commander, UKAF3 (from Apr 2011)

N2224 took over from N1785 in the role of Commanding Officer of UKAF3 in April 2011. N1785 briefed N2224 about the existence of N1799’s written statement and gave him a hard copy of the note which he had provided to DSF. Like his predecessor, N2224 did not alert the Service Police to the existence of this letter.

N2349, Chief of Staff, UKAF3

N2349 was Chief of Staff to N1785. Having read a number of operational reports from UKSF night raids in Afghanistan throughout early 2011, he had significant concerns which he communicated via email to other UKSF officers. Reading the report from the operation on 9 February, for example, where eight people had been killed in Musa Qala but only four weapons ‘recovered’, N2349 claimed it was ‘a massive failure of leadership. If we don’t believe this, then no one else will and when the next Wikileaks occurs then we will be dragged down with them.’ Several days later, as more reports were coming in with highly-suspicious deaths, he was pointing out that amongst the UKSF unit there ‘appears to be a casual disregard for life, COIN principles and credible reporting.’

N2349 was also the officer first approached by the whistleblower in March 2011, N1799, who recounted the conversation he had had with a member of the unit. N2349 then passed this information onto his commanding officer, N1785.

UKSF Headquarters (Afghanistan)

N1786, Commander (until Apr 2011)

N1786 was Commanding Officer of UKSF in Afghanistan until April 2011. He was therefore in post during the time that the deployed unit killed over 50 Afghan boys and men in suspicious circumstances. He was criticised at the time by UKSF officers for his handling of allegations of unlawful killings, with one officer writing that ‘I am unimpressed by N1786 lack of control over this.’ By April 2011, N1786 was tasked with conducting the 2011 TTP Review along with N1788, who had flown out from London for the task. Despite his intimate knowledge of these events, however, he was never approached by the RMP’s Operation Northmoor team to provide a witness statement, and does not appear to have given an account of what he knew and how he acted.

N1785, Commander (Apr 2011 – Apr 2012)

After his time as Commanding Officer of UKAF3, the BBC has reported that Gwyn Jenkins (N1785) was posted to Afghanistan in April 2011 as Commanding Officer of all UKSF in the country. He was in post for twelve months, during which time at least 15 Afghans were killed in suspicious circumstances during UKSF operations. His staff in Kabul were also clearly involved in attempts to ‘nip in the bud’ allegations of unlawful killings, including by attempting to sideline concerns raised by an international organisation in relation to specific incidents of apparent extrajudicial killings.

N889, Chief of Staff (until Summer 2011)

N889 was Chief of Staff at UKSF headquarters in Kabul, under both N1786 and N1785. He was on multiple email chains throughout this period regarding concerns of unlawful killings, abuse of the TTP, and how to ‘nip’ these allegations ‘in the bud’.

N6881, Chief of Staff (from Summer 2011)

N6881 replaced N889 as Chief of Staff at UKSF headquarters in Afghanistan during the summer of 2011, working under N1785. As such, he was aware that a major international organisation had raised concerns about how UKSF had been conducting operations, and was involved in attempts to ‘nip in the bud’ such allegations.

N2136 was a legal advisor in the UKSF headquarters in Afghanistan in August 2011. Following concerns from an international organisation about UKSF operations, it was suggested by N6881 (Chief of Staff) and N2108 (Senior Legal Advisor in London) that N2136 conduct a ‘legal health check’ of the house clearance TTP. They were, however, encouraged to not ‘do too much on this’ and to treat it as a ‘slow burn’.