A collection of declassified documents from the 1940s and 1950s, relating to the organisation of Australian signals intelligence during the immediate postwar period and the gradual integration of Australia into the UKUSA Agreement which underpins Five Eyes intelligence sharing.
This collection includes over 300 documents declassified by the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), the equivalent body to the US National Security Agency and GCHQ. The documents relate to the organisation of signals intelligence in Australia and New Zealand during the 1940s and 1950s, including the creation of the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB) and the Defence Signals Bureau (DSB) – the latter established in 1947 as Australia’s cryptologic and communications security agency.
The documents are primarily authored by organisations within the Australian Department of Defence, particularly the Defence Committee, the Defence Signals Branch, the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Joint Intelligence Bureau (Melbourne). The collection also includes communication between these agencies and other arms of the Australian government – such as the Prime Minister’s Department and the Department for External Affairs – as well as with officials and intelligence officers from the UK and New Zealand.
While some of the documents remain redacted, they provide an important insight into the development of Five Eyes intelligence sharing during a key transitional period, where the existing framework of British imperial intelligence was gradually incorporated into the postwar UKUSA Agreement. They include, for example, documents relating to a ‘Tripartite Conference’ held in Melbourne in September 1953, a meeting that establish a basis for collaboration between the DSB and the NSA.
Key documents in this collection
The Combes Report (Nov 1945)
Following the end of the Second World War, Brigadier General B. Combes, a British Army officer on loan to the Australian Department of Defence, was tasked with producing a report to provide recommendations for the organisation of postwar joint intelligence. Combes argued that intelligence should have proper status as a major defence activity, and that joint intelligence was more efficient and economical than individual services acting independently. His report made the case for ‘Empire Intelligence’, arguing that, given Australia’s small resources, it would benefit from being part of a wider organisation, especially in the field of ‘sigint’ (signals intelligence).
Cabinet Agendum 1213: Joint Intelligence Organisation – Post War (Jul 1946)
On 23 July 1946, Cabinet approved in principle the recommendations of a Defence Committee report on postwar Joint Intelligence Organisation. In line with the Combes Report, the Defence Committee recommended that Australian intelligence should fit into the overall Empire Intelligence pattern, ‘in order to facilitate the free interchange of intelligence and thus ensure for Australia a world wide coverage of intelligence.’ Among other things, it proposed the establishment of a Joint Intelligence Bureau, with New Zealand invited to participate in its activities, and a Signal Intelligence Centre, which would form part of the British Commonwealth signals intelligence effort. The establishment of a Defence Security Organisation was also recommended, along with new machinery for the control of integrated intelligence, led by the Joint Intelligence Committee.
Letters: Joint Intelligence Organisation, Dr John Burton and Sir Frederick Shedden (May-Dec 1947)
Between May and December 1947, Dr John Burton, Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, and Sir Frederick Shedden, Secretary of the Department of Defence, exchanged a series of letters which together show significant disagreement between the two over the developments in Joint Intelligence Organisation. For example, a letter of 30 June 1947 shows Burton objected to suggestions that the Joint Intelligence Bureau should collate and distribute intelligence material related to political developments overseas, as this was the responsibility of External Affairs. Burton also appeared extremely reluctant to allow the Signal Intelligence Centre to produce his Department’s codes if the Centre was to be staffed by officials from countries other than Australia. But these objections amounted to more than inter-department rivalry, as a letter from 15 August 1947 shows: Burton raised his opposition to the whole notion of a formal British Commonwealth Joint Intelligence Organisation, which he suggested ‘can in the long run only lead to embarrassments.’ Instead, Burton argued that Australia should have an independent intelligence organisation only loosely linked with that of other members of the Commonwealth. These objections resulted in a delay to the establishment of the Joint Intelligence Bureau and the Signal Intelligence Centre, which clearly frustrated Sir Shedden.
Australia and the UKUSA Agreement
A ‘Tripartite Conference’ was held in Melbourne in September 1953 to establish a basis for collaboration between the DSB and the US National Security Agency. The main recommendations of the conference were incorporated into an amended Appendix J (‘Principles of UKUSA Collaboration with Commonwealth Countries other than the United Kingdom’) and a new Annexure J1 (‘UKUSA Arrangements Affecting Australia and New Zealand’), which were formally put forward in September 1955. These changes were discussed by both the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Defence Committee, eventually securing ministerial approval in May 1956.
Having been written into the UKUSA Agreement as ‘collaborating Commonwealth countries’, the documents show that Australia soon looked to gain greater access to intelligence reports, particularly from the US. In July 1957, for example, the Acting Director of the Defence Signals Branch sent a letter to the Director of GCHQ requesting a wider service of COMINT from the UK and US than had previously been available. Although the letter is heavily redacted, it notes that: ‘While the material already received from GCHQ has been invaluable to Australian consumers and is greatly appreciated, it is observed that it is limited to that originated by GCHQ itself. It seems likely that a more complete service could be given if material originated by NSA could also be released to DSB.’
Post-War Development of Australia’s Intelligence Machinery: A Documentary Survey (undated)
This undated report gives a survey of documentary material held by the Department of Foreign Affairs which related to the initial setting up of the postwar Joint Intelligence Committee, the Joint Intelligence Bureau, the Defence Signals Division, and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service in 1946 and 1947. It seems that the report was produced for the Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security, set up in August 1974 and led by Justice Robert Hope. The report of the Royal Commission was ultimately critical of the role of the Defence Signals Division (as the Defence Signals Bureau became known) in the Five Eyes alliance, believing that Australia needed an independent intelligence capability.